MigrationWatchdog

Integration and culture

The official evidence on integration: language, extremism referrals, what formal inquiries actually found, and where public opinion stands.

How this page works. It reports official statistics and inquiry findings, quoted exactly. It distinguishes ideologies from individuals, and specific criminal networks from the communities they came from. Nothing here supports generalisation about any nationality, faith or community beyond what the cited source itself states.

English language (Census 2021, England & Wales)

5,134,447
main language is not English
Census day, 21 March 2021 · source
879,782
cannot speak English well
Census day, 21 March 2021 · source
160,564
cannot speak English at all
Census day, 21 March 2021 · source

Of 57,704,263 usual residents aged 3 and over, 8.9% had a main language other than English, and 1.8% could not speak English well or at all — just over a million people. Language is the single most measurable integration gap: it constrains work, services and civic participation.

Denominator is usual residents aged 3 and over. Proficiency is self-reported and asked only of people whose main language is not English (or Welsh in Wales). England and Wales only. The census is a March 2021 snapshot and predates the arrival waves since. Per-area breakdowns are on each local authority page.

Work: labour market status by country of birth

Employment, unemployment and economic inactivity rates by country of birth
Country of birthEmployment rate (16-64)Unemployment rate (16+)Economically inactive (16-64)
UK-born74.4%4.5%22%
Non-UK-born (all)77.2%6.4%17.5%
EU-born80.1%6.2%14.4%
Non-EU-born75.9%6.5%18.8%
All aged 16-6474.9%5%21%

The aggregate picture cuts both ways and is reported as published: non-UK-born residents have a higher overall employment rate than the UK-born, alongside a higher unemployment rate — aggregates that also vary widely by origin.

Jan-Mar 2026 (LFS, not seasonally adjusted) · source

Employment and inactivity rates cover ages 16-64; unemployment covers 16+. Labour Force Survey estimates — small samples are volatile. Country of birth, not nationality: many non-UK-born residents are British citizens.

Extremism: Prevent referrals by type of concern

8,775
Prevent referrals in a year
April 2024 to March 2025 · source
1,495
adopted as Channel cases
April 2024 to March 2025 · source
No ideology identifiedNo ideology identified: 3,0403,040No ideology – other susceptibility to…No ideology – other susceptibility to radicalisation identified: 1,9051,905Extreme Right WingExtreme Right Wing: 1,7931,793Islamist ExtremismIslamist Extremism: 866866Fascination with extreme violence or …Fascination with extreme violence or mass casualty attacks (where no other ideology): 457457Multiple ideologies (with no dominant…Multiple ideologies (with no dominant ideology): 420420OtherOther: 177177InCelInCel: 6565Left Wing ExtremismLeft Wing Extremism: 2121
Type of concern recorded at referral, using the Home Office's own categories verbatim. Individuals referred to Prevent: to September 2025 (Home Office), April 2024 to March 2025.
Referrals are concerns raised with the programme — not offences, arrests or convictions — and thresholds and recording practice have changed over time. Category names are the Home Office's own, reproduced verbatim. Islamist extremism is an ideology; nothing in these figures is a statement about British Muslims generally, and this site does not use them as one.

Group-based child sexual exploitation: what the inquiries found

Two formal investigations — IICSA (2022) and Baroness Casey's national audit (2025) — examined group-based child sexual exploitation, including the role of ethnicity. Their findings are reproduced verbatim below, with page references. These findings concern specific criminal networks and the institutions (councils, police, government) that failed to confront them — they are not statistics about any ethnic or religious group as a whole.

National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (Baroness Casey of Blackstock) · 16 June 2025 · p.8
The ethnicity data collected for victims and perpetrators of group-based child sexual exploitation is not sufficient to allow any conclusions to be drawn at the national level.
National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (Baroness Casey of Blackstock) · 16 June 2025 · p.8
We found that the ethnicity of perpetrators is shied away from and is still not recorded for two-thirds of perpetrators, so we are unable to provide any accurate assessment from the nationally collected data.
National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (Baroness Casey of Blackstock) · 16 June 2025 · p.137
When we looked at data held in three local areas, there is evidence that men of Asian ethnicity are over-represented as perpetrators in group-based child sexual exploitation in those areas.
Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA): Child sexual exploitation by organised networks · February 2022
As set out in Part H, this investigation demonstrated a widespread failure in the case study areas to record the ethnicity of perpetrators and victims of child sexual exploitation.
Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA): Child sexual exploitation by organised networks · February 2022
The failure to collect data on the ethnicity of the perpetrators and victims of child sexual exploitation, and the failure to make a public statement of the reasons why it is important to collect such data, have also led to a one-sided and often uninformed public debate where links have been made between ethnicity and a number of high-profile cases involving South Asian men.

The through-line of both inquiries is the same: where local data existed it showed over-representation of particular groups of men in this specific crime pattern, and the national data needed to establish the full picture was not collected — a failure both inquiries condemned. Demanding that data be collected is a data-transparency position, not a statement about any community.

Public opinion

Polling is reported here only with the pollster, fieldwork dates, sample size and exact question wording — because question wording drives results.

More in Common · 26–28 June 2026 · n=2,852

Which of the following comes closest to your view?

  • Immigration levels in recent years: much too high48%
  • A bit too high24%
  • About right17%
  • A bit / much too low3%
  • Don't know8%
GB adults (excluding Northern Ireland), weighted by age/sex, region, 2024 vote, ethnicity and education.

Percentages from the published weighted tables, rounded. The item asked about immigration levels in recent years; answer scale ran from 'Much too high' to 'Much too low'.

More in Common · 26–28 June 2026 · n=2,852

Which of the following comes closest to your view?

  • I like living in a community with more people who come from different cultural backgrounds.53%
  • I like living in a community where most people come from the same cultural background.47%
GB adults (excluding Northern Ireland), weighted by age/sex, region, 2024 vote, ethnicity and education.

Forced-choice item; percentages from the published weighted tables, rounded.

Data as of

Sources for this page